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PUBLIC HOUSING AND
DISCRIMINATION IN SITE SELECTION
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appliance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discrimination between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the constitution.'
The recent decision of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority2 held that
it must be clear to all, with clear perception, that the pattern of de facto housing
segregation in public housing has chiefly resulted because of the uniform prac-
tice of the dominant white majority in discriminating generally against blacks
in the sale and rental of housing. In Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of
San Jose,s the Supreme Court overturned a state constitutional provision, which
made referenda mandatory to determine the acceptability of low income public
housing sites, as being a totally benign, technical economic classification. The
courts stated that "referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias,
discrimination, or prejudice."
4
This comment analyzes the existing methods of determining site selection
for low income public housing as disclosed by Gautreaux and Valtierra and
discusses the claim that these methods violate the Constitution as a denial of
equal protection.
DIsCRIMINATION IN SITE SELECTION
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,5 black tenants and applicants
for public housing in Chicago brought suit against the Chicago Housing Au-
thority (CHA) contending that the defendants had deprived them of rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The first count of the complaint alleged
that the defendants had intentionally selected sites and assigned tenants to public
housing units in a manner that maintained "existing patterns of urban residential
segregation by race" in Chicago, thus violating plaintiffs' right to the equal pro-
tection of the laws. Count three was identical to the first count except that it
omitted any allegation of intent on the part of CHA.6 The plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief. The second and fourth counts repeated the
allegations of counts one and three, and demanded relief pursuant to section
601, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7
1 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
2 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
3 39 U.S.L.W. 4488 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1971).
4 Id. at 4489.
5 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
6 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F.Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. IMI. 1967).
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
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CHA moved to dismiss the complaint for three reasons: 1) that plaintiffs
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 2) that the plaintiffs
lacked standing, and 3) that the class action was improper.8 The court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss counts one and two but did dismiss counts three
and four because the plaintiffs' failed to allege intent.9
Evidence was heard on counts one and two and both parties moved for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs' motion was granted on the first count of the
complaint10 but denied on the second count.1' The second count sought an injunc-
tion against the use of federal funds by CHA. Although the court had stated
that a cause of action was presented, practically, relief could not be granted
because it would impede the construction of any public housing which would
put the plaintiffs in an even worse position.
12
Relief was postponed by the court to allow the parties an opportunity to
formulate a plan which would prohibit the future exclusive location of public
housing in predominately non-white areas. Several months later, the court entered
an order on the summary judgment.13 The order prohibited CHA from con-
structing any dwelling units in Cook County within a census tract having 30%
or more non-white population 14 until it had commenced construction of seven
hundred dwelling units in the rest of Cook County. 15 The court further ordered
that once these conditions were satisfied, the CHA must build three units in
areas not having thirty percent or more non-white population to every one unit
built within such an area.16 The same three-to-one ratio was applied to those
units which the CHA leases, rather than builds.17
The court was influenced by the fact that continuance of past site selection
patterns by the CHA would lead to the creation of new black public housing
ghettos to the exclusion of whites from public housing. To prevent the creation
of black ghettos within white areas, it ordered that each public housing structure
be planned for occupancy by not more than 120 persons' s and that the number
of CHA low income, non-elderly units be restricted to fifteen percent of all
dwelling units within a given census tract.19 The court was confronted with the
following facts: (1) ninety percent of the people on the waiting list for public
housing were blacks, 20 (2) in Chicago there are twice as many whites eligible
8 265 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ml1. 1967).
) Id. at 584.
10 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
11 Id. at 914-15.
12 Id. at 915.
13 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, Civil No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill. July 1,
1969).
14 "Dwelling Unit" is defined as an apartment or single family residence occupied by
a low-income, non-elderly family and furnished by or through CHA. Id. at 2.
15 Id. at 4.
16 Id. at 4.
17 Id. at 4-5. The order refers to these units as "Leased Dwelling Units." A Leased
Dwelling Unit is defined as "a Dwelling Unit in a structure leased or partially leased by
CHA from any person, firm, or corporation." Id. at 2.
'8 Id. at 5-6.
19 Id. at 6.
20 296 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
for low cost, non-elderly public housing as non-whites,21 and (3) the small
number of whites currently in public housing is a result of the undesirable loca-
tion of most of the present public housing units (in primarily non-white areas) .22
In Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose,2 8 suits were brought
by predominately black citizens of San Jose, California, and San Mateo County,
against the Housing Authority of the City of San Jose (HACSJ), the City
Council of San Jose (CCSJ), the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD), and the Housing Authority of San Mateo County (HASMC).
(Members in their official capacities of the HACSJ and CCSJ, as well as Secre-
tary George Romney of HUD, were joined as defendants.) The cases were con-
solidated for consideration. 24 Both cases involved "persons of low income" who
had been determined eligible for public housing and who had been placed on the
appropriate waiting lists. San Jose, California, and San Mateo County were
localities where housing authorities could not apply for federal funds because low
cost housing proposals had been defeated in referenda.
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that Article XXXIV of the California
State Constitution2 5 was unconstitutional because it violated: (1) the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution, (2) the privileges and immunities clause,
and (3) the equal protection clause. They further sought to enjoin the defen-
dants from relying upon that Article as a reason for not requesting federal
assistance with which to finance low income housing.
2 6
HUD and its Secretary moved for their dismissal because the complaint
did not seek any relief against them. Their motion was granted. The other de-
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. CaL 1970).
24 Id. at 3.
25 Article XXXIV-Public Housing Project Law
§ 1. Approval of electors; definitions.
Section 1. No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, con-
structed, or acquired in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of
the qualified electors of the city, town, or county, as the case may be, in which it
is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue,
approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that
purpose, or at any general or special election.
For the purposes of this article the term "low rent housing project" shall mean
any development composed of urban or rural dwellings, apartments or other living
accommodations for persons of low income, financed in whole or in part by the
Federal Government or a state public body or to which the Federal Government or
a state public body extends assistance by supplying all or part of the labor, by
guaranteeing the payment of liens, or otherwise. For the purposes of this article,
only there shall be excluded from the term "low rent housing project" any such
project where there shall be in existence on the effective date hereof, a contract
for financial assistance between any state public body and the Federal Government
in respect to such project.
For the purposes of this article only "persons of low income" shall mean persons
or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary (as determined by
the state public body developing, constructing, or acquiring the housing project)
to enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary
dwellings, without overcrowding.
26 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
fendants raised the following pleas in abatement: 27 (1) because California could
choose not to participate in the housing program, 28 it could participate by stipu-
lating any conditions it chose; (2) referenda are not subject to constitutional
scrutiny; (3) defendants could not be compelled to seek federal funding. The
court ruled that these pleas did not preclude it from reaching the merits of the
plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The court pointed out that the bases of the
pleas were not true and that the plaintiffs were not seeking to compel the defen-
dants to seek federal funding but merely seeking to forbid them from relying on
Article XXXIV as a reason for not requesting such funds.
29
In 1950, the California Supreme Court held that local authorities' decisions
regarding seeking federal aid for public housing projects were "executive" and
"administrative," not "legislative," and therefore the state constitution's refer-
enda provisions did not apply to these. decisions. 80 Within six months of that
decision, the California voters adopted Article XXXIV of the state constitution
to apply the state's referenda policy to public housing decisions. 3' The plaintiffs
demonstrated that Article XXXIV impeded the financing of new housing since
only fifty-two percent of the referenda submitted to the voters had been ap-
proved. 2 In Santa Clara County, referenda seeking permission to obtain housing
funds were defeated in 1968; and in San Mateo County, two similar referenda
were defeated in 1966."3 The Housing Director in San Mateo County felt other
attempts to secure passage of a referendum would be fruitless at present.3 4
The three judge court found the plaintiffs' supremacy clause argument un-
persuasive and did not reach the privileges and immunities argument, but it ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs on equal protection grounds.3 5
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed 6 holding that the record did not support
any claim that a law seemingly 7 neutral on its face was in fact aimed at a racial
minority.3 8 It added that provisions for referenda demonstrate devotion to
democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.3 9
27 Id. at 3.
28 United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.
29 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Cal
1970).
80 Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 557-58 (1950).
81 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 39 U.S.L.W. 4488 (U.S. Apr. 27,
1971).
32 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Cal
1970).
33 Id.
34 Id. (There was an affidavit supporting the plaintiffs' position that but for the ex-
istence of Article XXXIV local housing authorities would choose to apply for federal funds.)
35 Id. at 4.
36 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 39 U.S.L.W. 4488 (U.S. Apr. 27,
1971).
37 Emphasis added.





Courts have held that governmental action is presumptively valid and does
not violate equal protection unless intent to discriminate can be demonstrated
4 °
or that such action bears no rational relationship to the accomplishment of a
permissible public purpose.41 In cases where state action is particularly suspect
because a group has been singled out on the basis of race or some other "suspect
trait,"42 an "overriding justification" standard has been used.
The court in Gautreaux struck down the plaintiffs' prayers for relief to two
counts when they did not allege that the CHA intentionally selected most of their
sites within the areas heavily populated by non-whites. Since intent is difficult to
prove in most cases, the rule places a severe limitation on the availability of the
equal protection clause in fields such as public housing. The operation of this
government program in the context of pre-existing social conditions produces a
result which is unequal in fact, leaving identifiable disadvantaged groups worse
off than the rest of society. This result can be shown regardless of intent. The
problem regarding public housing is that the state action which produces in-
equality is often incontestably "rational," within the traditional context of the
equal protection clause. The programs are usually good faith, reasonable attempts
to cure social problems.
In Gautreaux, the plaintiffs alleged that the administration of the Illinois
public housing statute was "maintaining existing patterns of urban residential
segregated by race . . . ,,4s The problem had become so severe that "9912%
of CHA family units are located in areas which are or soon will be substantially
all Negro."'44 This type of adverse effect upon a disadvantaged group is a viola-
tion of equal protection whether or not it was the purpose of CHA to achieve it.
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,45 the plaintiffs
argued, inter alia, that the Norwalk Redevelopment Agency's administration of
the relocation program was effectively driving non-whites from the city of
Norwalk.46 No "suspect trait" was inherent in the statute or in its administration.
Proving that the agency intended the adverse effects which non-white displacees
were experiencing was difficult. The lower court held that the detrimental effects
resulted from an extremely tight and highly discriminatory housing market
which was in no way the fault of the authority. 47 The Second Circuit held, how-
ever, that even though this detrimental effect was "accidental," rather than
40 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
41 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (This test has primarily
been used when the governmental classification is essentially "economic.").
42 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race).
43 265 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
44 296 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
45 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); see Comment "Relocation, Accidental Inequities and
the Equal Protection Doctrine," 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579 (1969).
48 395 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1968).
47 Id. at 930.
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intentional, the planners should have foreseen such harsh effects. 48 Therefore,
the authority had an affirmative duty to insure that adequate housing was avail-
able to non-white displacees.
49
Since the facts in Gautreaux were exceptional, the proof of intent was not
a barrier to the cause of action. Actual discrimination was shown. The Illinois
statute requires that the Chicago City Council approve sites selected by CHA.50
CHA had developed the practice of informally submitting sites for family hous-
ing to the City Council alderman in whose ward the site was located. Sites in
white areas were almost invariably vetoed by the respective alderman and there-
fore not submitted for City Council approval because the waiting lists for public
housing were ninety percent black.51 CHA admitted that deliberate segregation
by race was an inherent and undisguised component of its system of selecting
public housing sites.
In Hicks v. Weaver,52 facts similar to Gautreaux were presented to the court
concerning the site selections for public housing in Bogalusa, Louisiana; the
court found intent, followed Gautreaux, and cited from Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) pronouncement that:
[A]ny proposal to locate housing only in areas of racial concentra-
tion will be prima facie unacceptable and will be returned to the Local
Authority for further consideration.5"
In Valtierra the gravamen of plaintiffs' equal protection claim is that the
express discrimination in Article XXXIV, as it applies only to "low income
persons," brings it squarely within the ban of a long line of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions forbidding the imposition of unequal burdens upon groups that are
not rationally differentiable in the light of any legitimate state legislative ob-
jective. 54 Courts have held that to contain or exclude persons simply because
they are poor is no longer a permissible legislative objective.
55
Although equal protection focuses on differences in treatment, the latitude
allowed the legislature in framing distinctions or permitting them to exist seems
to depend on a judicial judgment about the importance of the underlying
privileges. If the interest of the poor to equality in residential access is acknowl-
edged as of great importance and hence of high constitutional priority, and if the
absence of spokesmen for the poor in the corridors of municipal power is also
noted, a mandate exists for curing the land use decisional process.
48 Id. at 930-31. (The court clearly rejected any requirement of proof of a desire or
purpose to produce adversely unequal results.)
49 Id. at 931-32.
50 Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 67%, § 9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
51 296 F. Supp. 907, 912-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
52 302 F. Supp. 619 (1969).
53 HUD's Low Rent Housing Manual § 205.1 Par. 4(g) (February 1967 Revision).
54 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
55 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) ; cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962);
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 663 (1966).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In Valtierra the lower court relied heavily on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Hunter v. Erickson.56 In that case the Supreme Court invali-
dated an amendment to the city charter of Akron, Ohio, which required a
referendum before anti-discrimination legislation could be enacted. The court
noted that the requirement of a referendum before taking action drew no distinc-
tion among racial or religious groups. Blacks and whites, Jews and Catholics
were all subject to the same requirements. But the requirement of the referendum
nevertheless hindered those who would benefit from laws barring racial discrim-
ination as against those who would otherwise regulate the real estate market
in their favor.57 The court further noted that the impact of the law falls on
minorities, resulting in an impermissible burden which constitutes a substantial
and invidious denial of equal protection. 8
Article XXXIV of the California constitution defines low income persons as:
persons or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary
... to enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe,
and sanitary dwellings without overcrowding.
The article explicitly singles out low income persons to bear the burden of
the referenda. In California, state agencies may seek federal financial aid, with-
out first submitting the proposal to a referendum, for all projects except low
income houses.59 Some common examples, inter alia, are: highways, urban re-
newal, hospitals, colleges and universities, secondary schools, law enforcement
assistance, and model cities. 60 Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in Douglas v. Cali-
fornia6 ' where the majority held equal protection was denied when states refused
to provide appellate counsel for indigent criminal defendants whenever a first
appeal is granted as of right. He stated, "The states, of course, are prohibited by
the Equal Protection clause from discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as
such in the formulation and application of their laws.
'6 2
CONCLUSION
Although the decision in Gautreaux favored the plaintiffs, it works a hard-
ship on future plaintiffs who cannot prove intent to discriminate. Valtierra
stands as a conscious misuse of the referendum. Asking a majority to weigh
its feelings against the needs of a minority is merely to guarantee that those
needs will not be met. Public housing is an important problem and requires
leadership with foresight and imagination; a weighted scale may provide the
desired answer. In both Gautreaux and Valtierra, the court failed to follow the
decisions in a recent line of cases holding that even though a state is without
56 393 U.S. 385 (1968).
57 Id. at 391.
58 Id.
59 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
60 Id.
61 372 U.S. 353 (1962).
62 Id. at 361.
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fault and the detrimental effect is "accidental" rather than intentional, the
planners should have foreseen the harsh effects which are an impermissible
burden constituting a substantial and invidious denial of equal protection.
The reluctance of whites to enter public housing would be substantially
reduced if such housing became available in more desirable locations. Since
the housing market is becoming increasingly tight, whites who are eligible for
public housing in the future may no longer have the option of finding low rent
private housing and will seek desirable public housing units.
Does the Supreme Court's holding in Valtierra that the California refer-
endum law was not racially motivated mean it would also uphold a rash of new
state laws setting up similar referendum provisions? At present, only eight other
states have such a law. 63 To those who say that the referenda represents the will
of the people, one can only reply:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger
of oppression. In our Government the real power lies in the majority of
the community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be ap-
prehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instru-
ment of the major number of the constituents. This is a truth of great
importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to .... 64
LESTER MCKEEVER
63 Chicago Daily News April 27, 1971. (Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.)
64 Writings of James Madison, 272 (Hunt ed. 1904).
